









The financial press likes to refer to Fed offi-
cials as either “inflation hawks” or “inflation
doves.” The hawks are assumed to be insensitive
to unemployment issues, whereas the doves show
true compassion for the unemployed or poten-
tially unemployed.
As an inflation hawk who believes firmly that
sustained low inflation is employment-friendly,
I find this myth particularly troublesome. I think
the myth has two origins. First, economist A.W.
Phillips, writing in the late 1950s, proposed that
there is a tradeoff between unemployment and
inflation. Second, there have certainly been
periods in the past in which Federal Reserve
policy mistakes caused increases in unemploy-
ment, at least for a time. Let me address both of
these issues.
Phillips’ work sparked an enormous academic
literature. Based on his analysis of U.K. data,
Phillips claimed that unemployment was consis-
tently higher when inflation was lower, and unem-
ployment lower when inflation was higher. This
relationship became known as the Phillips curve.
A few years after the Phillips paper appeared, U.S.
economists argued the same about U.S. data.
In the mid-1960s, Milton Friedman and
Edmund S. Phelps independently published
papers disputing the existence of a Phillips curve
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation.
The gist of their critiques was that the apparent
empirical regularity was a short-run phenomenon,
not one that could continue over the long haul.
W
hy “Great Monetary Myths”?
Why not “Great Monetary Truths”?
I will certainly be discussing
some great truths in the process
of discussing great myths. My motivation,
though, is this: In any important area of public
policy, mistakes are often driven by public mis-
understanding of the issues. We live in a vigor-
ous democracy, and at the end of the day, at
least in the long run, the Federal Reserve will
pursue policies the voters want. As most of you
know, the U.S. President appoints, and the
Senate confirms, members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The
U.S. Congress can amend the Federal Reserve
Act at any time. If the public “knows” things
that aren’t true, this misinformation will ulti-
mately work its way through our democratic
government and damage monetary policy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments, but retain full responsibility for errors.
I will discuss four important monetary
myths. These are, first, that tight monetary policy
increases unemployment. Second, that tight
monetary policy raises interest rates. Third, that
higher interest rates depress the economy. And
fourth, that monetary policy decisions—the
Federal Reserve’s actions meeting by meeting—
are fundamentally political. In discussing these
myths, I’ll rely on economic information that I
hope convinces you that these claims are, in fact,
mistaken.Subsequent work and actual experience
around the world confirmed the validity of the
Friedman-Phelps view. The Phillips curve trade-
off was at most a short-run phenomenon. Some
of the monetary policy mistakes of the 1970s, how-
ever, were a direct consequence of the earlier
acceptance of the Phillips tradeoff view. But over
the course of the 1970s, we learned that policies
consistent with sustained higher inflation did not
produce sustained lower unemployment.
Let’s look at the common sense and funda-
mental economics aspects of the Phillips curve
issue. Suppose you travel to Europe and see in the
newspaper that the weather will be sunny with
temperatures around 18˚ Celsius. Do you take a
coat when you leave your hotel room? If you are
not familiar with the Celsius scale, it is easy to
make a mistake. But after you have gone outside
a few times, you will understand that 18˚ Celsius
is pretty close to 65˚ Fahrenheit. Your decision to
wear a coat will have nothing to do with whether
your thermometer reads 65˚ Fahrenheit or 18˚
Celsius.
By the same token, your behavior in the labor
market may well be affected as the inflationary
environment changes. If you are accustomed to
living with low inflation, as people were in 1965,
you may find your decisions affected by higher
inflation that is rather a surprise. Some of these
decisions may stem from your expectations that
the inflation will be temporary. Such expectations
are natural if the economy has enjoyed a substan-
tial period of low inflation.
Theunemploymentratedidfallsignificantlyin
the late 1960s as the rate of inflation rose. Workers
responded to higher money wages by accepting
jobs more readily, thereby decreasing unemploy-
ment, only to discover that higher inflation was
eroding the purchasing power of the higher money
wages. Real, or inflation-adjusted, wages just
weren’t as high as workers had expected. Similarly,
firms increased production in response to higher
prices, only to find that profits were elusive as
production costs rose more than anticipated.
Both workers and firms misread the wage and
price signals, just as American tourists traveling
abroad might misread the thermometer.
As higher inflation continued, people became
accustomed to the new environment. And as
people adjusted to higher inflation, they no longer
made the decisions they made in the late 1960s
when inflation was new and surprising. The
unemployment rate rose back to the levels seen
earlier, and indeed rose significantly higher dur-
ing several severe recessions.
Although the economy does seem to work
better and more efficiently when the rate of infla-
tion is in the 2 to 3 percent range than when it is
in the 8 to 10 percent range, the most important
point is that, as a first approximation, the unem-
ployment rate is little affected on the average.
People do learn how to function pretty well even
when they have to use a rubber monetary yard-
stick—a yardstick for which the purchasing power
of a dollar gets smaller and smaller year after year.
People adjusted pretty well to a world in which
wages and prices were rising at 8 or 10 percent
per year; most learned not to make mistakes from
assuming that the average level of prices was likely
to remain roughly unchanged, when in fact prices
were rising significantly.
So, it is simply a myth that the Federal Reserve
can follow an easy monetary policy that leads to
higher ongoing inflation with the benefit of sus-
tained lower unemployment. The argument that
the long-run Phillips curve is approximately ver-
tical—that there is no sustained tradeoff between
unemployment and inflation—is accepted by all
mainstream economists, whatever their political
persuasion. There are important and interesting
professional disputes about whether a short-run
tradeoff exists and, if so, how long it takes for
the economy to undergo the transition from the
short run to the long run. But in the economics
profession, the long-run issue has been settled
for 25 years.
U.S. experience in recent years certainly rein-
forces the lesson that there is no inconsistency
between sustained low inflation and sustained
low unemployment. Last year, the unemployment
rate averaged 4.2 percent; the rate had been 5.6
percent in 1995. Based on the annual average of
the consumer price index, the inflation rate was
2.2 percent last year; the rate had been 2.8 percent
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low inflation contributes to a somewhat lower
unemployment rate on the average; A.W. Phillips
was simply wrong. And I think there is an
absolutely compelling case that sustained low
inflation reduces the instability of the economy.
The bottom line? Sustained low inflation,
achieved through disciplined and predictable




The Federal Reserve conducts monetary policy
in the short run by setting a target for the federal
funds interest rate—the rate banks charge one
another on their loans of reserves on deposit at
Federal Reserve Banks. The Fed calls its target
the “intended federal funds rate.”
In common language, when the Fed increases
the intended federal funds rate, people say that
monetary policy is tighter. In this sense, the claim
that tight monetary policy raises interest rates is
true by definition. The interesting issue, though,
is whether a Fed policy that is successful in keep-
ing inflation low has the effect of raising interest
rates. A jump to the wrong conclusion is pretty
easy. The Fed raises the intended fed funds rate
to keep inflation under control. Therefore, it
seems, a policy to keep inflation under control
leads to higher interest rates. The problem is to
sort out short-run fluctuations from longer-run
fundamentals.
The way to understand this fallacy is to sup-
pose that the Fed had some other policy instru-
ment, not involving direct control of interest rates,
to maintain low and steady inflation. With sus-
tained low inflation, market forces will sometimes
push interest rates up and sometimes down. For
example, when economic conditions are particu-
larly strong, people will want to borrow funds to
support new business investment, new household
purchases of cars and houses, and so forth. In
times like these, interest rates will be on the high
side. When the economy weakens a bit, those
forces will push in the other direction and interest
rates will be somewhat lower. On average, over
time, if inflation remains low and steady, interest
rates will fluctuate around a level that is deter-
mined by non-monetary forces in the economy.
When the Fed conducts policy to sustain low
inflation by changing the intended fed funds rate,
what it is trying to do is to more or less mimic
how these market forces would cause interest
rates to fluctuate.
Suppose that the Fed resists market forces
that are pushing up interest rates at some partic-
ular time. The result is that the Fed creates an
excessive amount of liquidity in the economy,
unleashing inflationary forces. As inflation rises,
lenders demand an inflation premium in the
interest rates they charge, and borrowers are
willing to pay that premium. Where does the
inflation premium come from? Suppose you are
debating whether to spend $1,000 on the econo-
mist’s favorite object—the widget. You are consid-
ering waiting a year and investing the funds in a
savings deposit earning 4 percent. The inflation
rate is 2 percent, and let’s assume that the price of
the widgets will increase along with the general
level of prices. Your choice then is whether to buy
now, spending $1,000, or next year, spending an
expected $1,020. If you spend next year, you will
take the funds out of your savings account; at 4
percent interest, the $1,000 will have become
$1,040. In this example, the real, or inflation-
adjusted, rate of interest is 2 percent—nominal
interest of 4 percent less inflation of 2 percent.
Now suppose you expect 6 percent inflation
instead of 2 percent. You expect that in a year,
the widget will cost $1,060. If interest on your
savings account remains at 4 percent, you will
certainly want to buy now instead of waiting a
year. At 4 percent interest, lots of people will be
spending instead of saving, because the real rate
of interest is now negative—4 percent interest
less 6 percent inflation, or minus 2 percent. The
reduced supply of saving will force up nominal
interest rates. When nominal rates reach 8 percent,
the real rate will again be 2 percent—8 percent
interest less 6 percent inflation.
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starting in 1965, nominal interest rates will rise—
perhaps sooner, perhaps later—to reflect inflation
expectations. The home mortgage rate, for exam-
ple, went from 5.81 percent in 1965 to 14.70 per-
cent in 1981. If Fed policy is to keep inflation low,
the Fed will have to permit rates to rise or fall
from time to time. However, on the average,
interest rates will be substantially lower in a
period of low and stable inflation than during a
period of high inflation.
The bottom line? A Fed policy that resists
market pressures by holding interest rates down
can be successful for a few months or even a few
quarters at a time, but eventually both inflation
and interest rates will end up higher than they
would have had the Fed acted early to prevent
inflation from becoming embedded in the econ-
omy. Thus, a tight monetary policy that is suc-
cessful in keeping inflation low and stable will
keep interest rates on average lower than they
would be under a policy that permits higher
inflation.
MYTH THREE:
HIGHER INTEREST RATES WILL
DEPRESS THE ECONOMY
The claim that higher interest rates will
depress the economy is a myth. So too is the
claim that lower interest rates will stimulate the
economy. These myths reflect confusion over
whether, in any particular circumstance, rates
are being driven up or down by supply or demand
conditions.
Let’s start by emphasizing simple fundamen-
tals. Take out a scrap of paper, or just use your
imagination. Draw a supply and demand diagram
with price on the vertical axis and quantity on
the horizontal axis. The supply curve slopes up
and the demand curve slopes down. The inter-
section of the two defines the equilibrium price
and quantity in the marketplace. What can we
conclude about quantity from the knowledge that
price is higher? Nothing. Price can be higher either
because the supply curve has shifted back, sliding
along an unchanged demand curve or because
the demand curve has shifted out, sliding along
an unchanged supply curve. In one instance, price
is higher and quantity is lower; in the second
instance, price is higher and quantity is also
higher.
Let’s use this simple model to better under-
stand the relationship between interest rates and
economic activity. To concentrate on the policy
effects on economic activity, let’s assume that Fed
policy is successful in keeping inflation low. On
the vertical axis we’ll measure the interest rate,
which is a type of price, and on the horizontal
axis we’ll measure gross domestic product (GDP).
There is a complicated sort of demand curve
relating the interest rate to GDP—this demand
curve slopes down. That is, along this curve, lower
interest rates are associated with higher GDP.
There is also an upward-sloping supply curve
that is influenced by Federal Reserve policy
actions. If market forces shift the demand curve
out, the result will be higher interest rates and
higher GDP. If the supply curve, influenced by
Fed policy actions, shifts back, the result will be
higher interest rates and lower GDP. Thus, at the
equilibrium of these two curves, a higher interest
rate may be associated with lower GDP, but not
necessarily. Similarly, a lower interest rate may be
associated with higher GDP, but not necessarily.
The Fed’s job is to try to adjust monetary
policy so that the supply of goods and services is
matched by the demand for goods and services
at a low and stable inflation rate. If the Fed does
its job correctly, interest rates will rise as economic
fundamentals drive them higher, but inflation
will remain subdued. And, when required by
economic fundamentals, the Fed will push inter-
est rates down so that the equilibrium of supply
and demand for goods in the macro economy
occurs with no sustained change in the rate of
inflation.
Anyone with an Internet connection can
observe interest rates minute by minute, but there
is no way to observe economic activity minute by
minute. When we observe interest rates changing,
we can only guess at what is going on with the
level of activity. The myth is that higher interest
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economic activity, and lower rates with higher
activity. If you spend some time looking at the
data, you will see that it just isn’t true that higher
rates are typically associated with lower activity.
Indeed, you will be struck by the fact that histor-
ically, unemployment tends to be low when
interest rates are high and vice versa. This cyclical
pattern to interest rates goes back to the middle
of the 19th century, at the beginning of our sys-
tematic observations of interest rates and the
business cycle.
The reason for this pattern is that the Fed has
not always been successful in timing its policy
actions to achieve balance in supply and demand
at stable and low inflation. Often, in the past,
higher interest rates were associated with a boom-
ing economy, and an economy in which inflation
was rising. Also, often in the past, the Fed did not
act quickly enough to push interest rates down
when the economic fundamentals were pointing
toward a weaker economy.
So, the myth is that Fed action to propel
interest rates higher automatically points to a
weaker economy. Indeed, some monetary policy
mistakes in the past have arisen precisely because
too many people believed the myth. Fed policy-
makers sometimes recognized that inflation pres-
sures were building, but thought that rising interest
rates indicated that policy was restrictive. In many
of these cases, however, the Fed was holding
interest rates down from where the economic
fundamentals would have driven them. As a
consequence, the Fed was actually following an
expansionary policy at a time that inflation
pressures were building. For a simple analogy,
you cannot assume that your car is slowing just
because you are stepping on the brake. If you are
going down a steep mountain, you might not be
stepping on the brake hard enough, and your car
may be picking up speed. Similarly, in periods
of economic weakness in the past, the Fed and
many other observers sometimes confused falling
interest rates with an expansionary policy. The
most tragic example of such a miscalculation
occurred during the early years of the Great
Depression. Even though interest rates were falling
through most of the period from 1930 until the
bottom of the Depression in March 1933, mone-
tary policy was in fact contractionary. Rates sim-
ply were not falling as rapidly as they should
have, given the economic fundamentals of that
period.
There is, unfortunately, no simple way to tell
when interest rates are rising or falling rapidly
enough to maintain a balance between the econ-
omy’s supply of goods and its demand for goods
so that inflation will remain low. The Federal
Reserve evaluates a vast amount of information
in the process of reaching its policy decisions.
We in the Fed acknowledge that we do not always
get the analysis just right. But certainly for some
years now the Fed has been close enough to getting
things right that the outcomes for the economy
have been highly favorable. Fluctuations in the
inflation rate have been small, and the trend rate
of inflation has remained low. What you will find
looking at a chart covering this period is that infla-
tion has remained remarkably low and steady,
the unemployment rate has gradually fallen to
today’s level of 4 percent and interest rates have
fluctuated up and down. There is little obvious
relationship between the interest rate and the
level of economic activity over the last five years,
but what little we can observe is in the direction
of higher rates when GDP growth is higher and





Today we are in the middle of a primary
election campaign, and in a few months will be
in the middle of a national election campaign.
Discussing politics and the Fed can be a sensitive
issue, but I think it’s best to deal with this issue
forthrightly. The bottom line for me is certainly
that monetary policy decisions are not at all
political.
What is meant by the claim that monetary
policy decisions are political? One possible
Great Monetary Myths
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strengthen the position of one political party or
the other. Another possible meaning is that the
Federal Reserve makes its decisions for the pur-
pose of favoring certain groups over other groups.
I am convinced that Fed policy is not political in
either of these ways.
It is important to understand that the Federal
Reserve has essentially only one policy instru-
ment. I like to think of that instrument as being
the rate of money creation, or more generally the
rate of liquidity creation, for the economy as a
whole. In the short run, the Fed controls the cre-
ation of liquidity by adjusting the intended federal
funds rate. Whether you look at policy through a
money growth lens or through an interest rate
lens, the fact is that there is just the one policy
instrument. You can think of Fed policy either in
terms of liquidity creation or interest rates, but
not both, because the Fed cannot independently
control liquidity creation and interest rates.
With one policy instrument, the Fed can at
most achieve one policy objective. For the Fed,
that objective is the rate of inflation. The goal is
to keep the rate of inflation low and stable. The
Fed also has some freedom to adjust the timing
of its policy actions to contribute to overall eco-
nomic stability. For example, the FOMC reduced
the intended fed funds rate three times in quick
succession in the fall of 1998 in an effort—one
that turned out to be quite successful—to keep
the financial disruption following the Russian
default from affecting the U.S. macro economy.
Last year, as the financial disruption faded, the
Fed took back those three rate cuts. Thus, the Fed
was able to take policy actions to reduce rates
and then raise them again to smooth the course
of the overall economy, and it was able to take
these actions without jeopardizing its basic goal
of low and stable inflation.
So that is what the Fed is trying to do. Is there
any particular political agenda to achieving low
and stable inflation? I think not. The goals of low
inflation and high employment are broadly shared
across all segments of U.S. society.
Does low inflation tend to redistribute income
away from one income class toward another?
There is a substantial professional literature on
the effects of inflation on the distribution of
income. The fact that the goal of low inflation
is shared by both low-income groups and high-
income groups suggests that any redistribution
effects of inflation are likely to be small. Indeed,
the evidence is pretty clear that a higher rate of
inflation would have very mixed effects in terms
of redistribution of wealth and income. Lower
income people, for example, have most of their
wealth tied up in assets that suffer reduced pur-
chasing power as inflation rises. By the same
token, their debts become less onerous when the
inflation rate is higher. However, those within
any income class have quite different financial
situations; within each income class, unantici-
pated inflation helps some and hurts others. In
short, there is no obvious way that the central
bank could affect the income and wealth positions
of higher or lower income groups by choosing a
different rate of inflation.
Could the Fed adjust the timing of its policy
actions in the short run to favor one political party
or the other? In principle, the answer is yes, but
in practice the protections built into the structure
of the Fed make the risk remote. I’ll discuss these
protections in enough detail to convince you, I
hope, that Fed policy is not at all partisan.
In terms of the backgrounds of Fed policy-
makers, I detect no predominant political outlook.
Members of the Board of Governors are appointed
by the President. Thus, given that governors have
14-year terms, at any one time some governors
were appointed by a President from one political
party and some by a President from the other
political party. Moreover, there is no consistent
pattern in the political affiliation of the governors
appointed by any particular President. President
Carter initially appointed Paul Volcker as Chair-
man, but President Reagan re-appointed him.
President Reagan initially appointed Alan
Greenspan as Chairman, but President Clinton
twice re-appointed him.
Among the Reserve Bank presidents, party
affiliation is pretty obvious for some, like me,
who may have served in a previous position in a
particular political administration. I am not at all
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my fellow presidents. If you read their speeches,
I doubt that you will find it obvious either.
Members of the boards of directors of Federal
Reserve Banks are also of varied political persua-
sion. Here again, I really don’t know what the
political persuasion is of the boards, including
my own. Of course, I can make some guesses,
but the issue really does not come up.
Each Fed board has three of its nine directors
from the commercial banking industry. Sometimes
people claim that commercial bankers are pre-
disposed to high interest rates. That is certainly
not my experience with bankers on the St. Louis
Fed board. I see no evidence that they are uni-
formly predisposed in either direction when it
comes to interest rate changes. In fact, at least in
today’s economy, it’s not so clear whether com-
mercial banks benefit even in the short run from
higher interest rates. Commercial banks live off
the spread between the interest rates they charge
and the interest rates they must pay to attract
funds. The principle is easy to understand by
considering a bank with a substantial credit-card
business. Credit-card interest rates are very sticky;
they change infrequently. The cost of funds to a
bank responds pretty sensitively to changes in
short-term market interest rates. A bank with a
credit-card business is likely to be unhappy when
market rates rise because its business will be less
profitable.
Exactly how any one bank is affected by higher
interest rates is dependent on the nature of the
bank’s business and how the bank has positioned
itself. I think that banks generally tend to benefit
in the short run when the Fed lowers interest rates,
because the rates banks pay on funds they borrow
are typically a bit more flexible than the rates
banks charge on the funds they lend. This analysis
is consistent with recent comments by some stock
market observers who have argued that rising
interest rates over the last year explain the rela-
tively weak performance of bank stocks.
In any event, bank managers and shareholders
do have an intense interest in seeing that the
overall economy remains stable. Any developing
situation that might lead to a recession will be a
threat to bank earnings because loan defaults rise.
Thus, I think that bankers, as well as others in
the economy, have a strong reason to favor con-
tinuing low and stable inflation, which helps to
maintain continuing growth in business without
a recession.
Finally, if you believe that the Fed’s short-run
policy decisions are political in nature, I urge
you to take time to read the transcripts of FOMC
policy deliberations. The transcripts are released
with a lag of about five years. The transcripts for
1994 will be released soon and transcripts for most
earlier years are already available. The transcript
is taken from the tape of FOMC meetings; the
only changes reflect minor corrections to grammar
and deletion of references to particular firms and
foreign governments that would violate confiden-
tiality. I challenge you to read those transcripts
and find any convincing evidence that monetary
policyissetonthebasisofpoliticalconsiderations.
One final consideration is that the Federal
Reserve has elaborate provisions preventing
political activity by Reserve Bank officers and
directors. Each Reserve Bank has an ethics officer
who oversees these matters. You will not find
Federal Reserve officials or directors involved in
any political campaigns; they do not engage in
fundraising for candidates or in any overt political
activity whatsoever. You will not find any Federal
Reserve officials serving as advisers, unofficial
or otherwise, to the candidates.
The bottom line? Federal Reserve policy
decisions simply are not political in any usual
sense of that term.
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
I have discussed four great monetary myths.
First, that tight monetary policy increases unem-
ployment. Second, that tight monetary policy
raises interest rates. Third, that higher interest
rates will depress the economy. Fourth, that
monetary policy decisions are fundamentally
political.
To understand why these claims are myths,
it helps to understand some economics. For infla-
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sometimes be higher, sometimes lower. We must
distinguish between shifts in supply conditions
and shifts in demand conditions. We must dis-
tinguish between short-run and long-run condi-
tions. If you put some effort into understanding
the basic economics of these issues, and if you
spend some time reading, you can form your
own independent judgment on the claims I have
labeled “myths.” I think you’ll reach the same
conclusion I have—a conclusion I reached long
before I came to the St. Louis Fed two years ago.
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